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THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ROBERTO: A
THEOLOGICAL POLEMIC
H. JEFFERSON POWELL*
Roberto Mangabeira Unger occupies a prominent, if ambiguous,
place in contemporary American legal culture. Along with Duncan
Kennedy and Morton Horwitz, Unger is usually regarded as one of the
creators of the intellectual and academic/political movement that calls
itself Critical Legal Studies. Unger has also played a role in the world of
governmental politics: he helped to found the contemporary democratic
leftist movement in his native Brazil.1 And unlike most CLS members,
Unger in the past has identified his work as Christian in its intellectual
underpinnings. 2
In this Essay, I want to take seriously Unger's theological self-iden-
tification as a basis for interpreting his latest (and apparently incomplete)
work, Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory. 3 Even in its pres-
ent form, Politics is Unger's lengthiest work, and his most ambitious in-
tellectual project since Knowledge and Politics. Building on the work
that he has done in the interim in legal and social theory4 and in the
philosophy of personhood, 5 Unger has now accomplished a considerable
amount of the great task he set for himself in his programmatic essay The
Critical Legal Studies Movement:6 the creation and presentation of a
political program embodying a "visionary insight into a reordered social
* Visiting Professor, Duke Law School; Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I deeply ap-
preciate comments and criticisms by Carol Barry, Kate Bartlett, Lawrence Baxter, Stanley
Hauerwas, and Denise Thorpe.
1. See Simon, Social Theory and Political Practice: Unger's Brazilian Journalism, 81 Nw.
U.L. REV. 832 (1987) (discussing Unger's activity as a political journalist in Brazil).
2. R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 22-29 (1984); Kronman, Book Review,
61 MINN. L. REV. 167, 203-04 (1976) (reprinting letter from Unger to Kronman).
3. Unger's Politics (1987-) currently consists of three volumes:
(1) SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK;
(2) FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DE-
MOCRACY; and
(3) PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS.
This Essay will cite the volumes of Politics by the numbers that I have assigned;. e.g., 1:44 is a
reference to p. 44 of Social Theory.
4. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY
(1976).
5. See R. UNGER, supra note 2.
6. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
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world."'7 Such a program, Unger insisted in that essay, would require a
"credible theory of social transformation,"' 8 "a conception of the ideal
that should guide the reconstruction of ... institutional forms," 9 and an
account of the regenerate "direct practical or passionate dealings among
people" that necessarily would accompany the remaking of the institu-
tional order.'0 This is no small task, to put it mildly, and in carrying it
out Unger has displayed remarkable energy and an admirable willingness
to rethink his own previously expressed views.
Nowhere in Politics does Unger directly lay claim to a Christian
stance, or adopt in his own voice explicitly faithful language.11 I shall
argue nonetheless that Politics is a deeply theological work, and that it
may usefully be examined from a theological viewpoint. Indeed, I shall
go further and claim that Unger's work demands such an evaluation:
Politics offers its reader a richly detailed and symbol-laden account of
human existence, an account that possesses cosmic scope and emotional
depth; it purposively offers its readers a "symbolic structure through
which [their] community [might] view reality, truth, and value and thus
through which it [might] express its perspective on the world and on
itself."' 12 One response to such a work is to evaluate it from the stand-
point of theology-the discipline that seeks to examine reflectively and
critically such symbolic structures. 13 An analysis of Unger's theology
will enable us, I hope, to evaluate his specific political and legal proposals
more readily.14
This Essay is divided into six sections. In the first I briefly examine
Unger's rhetoric in an effort to defend the claim that Politics implicitly
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 25.
11. Compare R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLIcS 295 (1975), in which the author directly
addresses God.
12, L. GILKEY, MESSAGE AND EXISTENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 55
(1979).
13. The value of a theological interpretation of a work such as Politics is not limited to those
who share the interpreter's own theological and philosophical views. Unger's fundamental vision of
"reality, truth, and value" is inseparable from his political program: the primary task of the theolog-
ical interpreter (as opposed to the legal commentator, for example) is to understand what that vision
is. For a discussion of the place of theology in modem intellectual discussions, see H.R. NIEBUHR,
Theology in the University, in RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE 93 (1960).
14. In an exchange of letters with Professor Anthony Kronman that was published as an ap-
pendix to Kronman's review of Ungers Knowledge and Politics, Unger asserted that Kronman's
criticisms stemmed at least in part from a failure to recognize the Christian and indeed Catholic
background to Unger's work. Kronman, supra note 2, at 200-01. I certainly agree with Unger that
his readers need to address his theology, but it is ironic that Unger directed this completely legiti-
mate complaint at Kronman, one of the most philosophically and theologically sophisticated of con-
temporary legal scholars.
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asserts a prophetic and even scriptural character. The following four sec-
tions address what I identify as Unger's accounts of creation, redemp-
tion, church, and the state of salvation. 15 In the conclusion I identify
gnosticism 16 as the appropriate theological categorization of Unger's
thought.
A final observation: this Essay is not a complete or a putatively
neutral review of Unger's work. A great deal of Politics, especially Un-
ger's social critique of contemporary Western culture, seems to me in-
sightful and, indeed, perfectly consistent with traditional Christian
beliefs. Unger is a major contemporary exponent of the Christian tradi-
tion's "commitment to ... social iconoclasm," 17 and in reading Politics
theologically, I have sought to address his ideas within an interpretive
framework that I share with him. But for all its power and seductive-
ness, the vision of human existence that underlies Politics is, I believe,
profoundly disturbing and profoundly wrong. I therefore have written a
polemic against this vision, rather than a complete review of Politics.
The reader should bear in mind the partial (in both senses) nature of this
Essay.
I. SCRIPTURE: UNGER AS EVANGELIST
Near the beginning of the introductory volume of Politics, Unger
expresses a refreshing sense of his own limits: "When the larger argu-
ment falls into confusion and obscurity, when I stagger and stumble, help
me. Refer to the purpose described in this book and revise what I say in
the light of what I want" (1:9). This personal humility is not matched,
however, by Unger's predominant style of rhetoric in Politics. Rather
than inviting conversation and correction, Unger's language asserts au-
thority and demands assent. In doing so, Unger has created for those
who assent to his program a text that claims authority parallel to that
enjoyed by the Bible in traditional Jewish and Christian thought.
The purpose of Politics, we are told, is to lead us to successfully
"learn and practice the gospel of plasticity" (3:2). 18 Unger seeks to
launch "a new and more powerful assault upon superstition and despot-
15. Creation, redemption, church, and salvation are, of course, theological concepts that, as I
use them, derive their meaning from Christian theology. My application of these concepts to Un-
ger's thought is provisionally justifiable because Unger himself has identified Christianity as a major
source of his thought. See, eg., R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 22-39. A final judgment about the
usefulness of these concepts depends on the degree to which they further our understanding of Un-
ger's work, a judgment that the reader must make.
16. For a definition of this term, see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
17. R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 24.
18. "Plasticity" is Unger's most frequent label for the state of social relationships, free of hier-
archy and division, that he wishes to create. See, eg., 1:59, :210-14.
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ism" (1:3) than was mounted either by the emancipatory political move-
ments of the modem West or by "the social iconoclasm of the world
religions" (1:57). Unger describes social theories with which he disagrees
as burdened with "the superstitions of false necessity" (1:172). He labels
their acceptance of a naturalness or fixity of social structure as "the sin
the prophets called idolatry" (1:18).
In contrast, Unger's own social theory is a sustained attempt to pro-
phetically "disrupt" the link between the status quo and our understand-
ing of "ultimate reality" (1:43). His affirmative goal is "to lift the burden
of rigid hierarchy and division that weighs on our practical and passion-
ate relations with one another" (1:5).19 To live out the political and
"personalist" program that Unger presents would be both evangelical
and redemptive: Unger's express goal is to bring others into a new rela-
tionship with themselves and one another that is freed of enslavement to
the oppressive forces of the old life. Writing of the attempt to make his
vision a reality, Unger states that "[w]hen the anticipatory experiment
[in the program] goes well . .. [it] invokes a higher, renewed order of
human life and demands an assent which is also a redemptive complic-
ity" (2:412). Success for Unger would be the creation of a "regenerate
community" (1:39).
Politics is suffused with this type of quasi-religious language. I be-
lieve this to be neither accident nor mistake. Politics aims to present a
world view with all-embracing descriptive and normative force, to per-
suade the reader to accept Unger's message, and by doing so to enter his
movement and denounce other visions as idolatrous and in error. Unger
presents us with a gospel and calls on us to accept it.
II. CREATION: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF IMAGINATION
Christianity has traditionally rejected all accounts of the universe
that deny God's radical creativity. God spoke and creation was. In cre-
ating, God neither struggled with dark forces of chaos (as in ancient
Near Eastern mythology) nor imposed form on preexisting matter (as in
much Greek thought). Rather, God is Creator in the strong sense that
He made all that exists ex nihilo, out of nothing. With regard to divine
freedom, therefore, both the particularities and the very existence of crea-
tion are wholly contingent: they need not be as they are.20
The account of the universe in Politics retains the doctrine of crea-
tion's traditional themes, but gives them a dramatic twist. In the Unger-
19. Cf Isaiah 9:4 ("the yoke his burden... Thou hast broken").
20. For a discussion of the Christian doctrine of creation, see L. GILKEY, MAKER OF HEAVEN
AND EARTH 13-105 (1959).
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ian universe, the creative actor is humanity individually and collectively,
and the agency of creation is the human imaginative will. The world is
radically contingent because we can imagine it different. Unger's episte-
mological starting point is that we can understand something only by
subjecting it to our imagination, comparing it to what it is not and mak-
ing it bend to our transformative powers of fantasy and reconception.
"You understand a portion of reality by passing it, in fact or fantasy,
through transformative variations: by imagining it other than what it is
or seems to be" (1:30). To understand "any part of reality" is to imagine
"it transformed" (1:43). Knowledge is thus an active function of human
assertion, of imposing the mind's choices on the things to be understood.
This is equally true of all forms of human thought and inquiry. Social
and political debate rests on people's "capacity to invent and to judge
social ideals" (1:39). Law ultimately rests on the imaginative creation of
"ideals of human association" (2:452; see also 2:513). In the writing of
history, "authenticity" is the result of "fidelity to the quality of lived
historical experience"-experience that is on Unger's account created by
the imagination, rather than by the "naive historiography" of "detail"
(2:176). Mathematics, logic, and physics, which even to a post-Kuhnian
can seem to be a product at least in part of external or analytic truth,
derive their power from their reflection of "something fundamental about
the workings of the imagination." They are not "a revelation of the way
things are and have to be in the world" (1:176). Most fundamentally for
Unger, we constitute ourselves and the worlds we live in by our willed
acts of imagination. "Through such efforts, and through them alone, you
discover and make yourself" (1:30; cf. 2:251). Indeed, our ideas about
the social universe are "self-fulfilling" (2:251).
The willed and imaginative character of the universe has particular
importance in Unger's social theory: such a theory inherently addresses
how we should construe the world as a normative matter. Such a vision
of the universe means that the social, economic, and political orders
within which we live are an "artifact" (1:1) and that society is not "be-
yond the reach of the will" (2:401). Something we have made is some-
thing we can remake or destroy, and by the same means we employed in
creation: "force and imagination" (3:20).
To understand and fully exercise humanity's imaginative sover-
eignty over society, we must employ what Unger regards as the crucial
intellectual dichotomy of Politics, "the contrast between frameworks and
routines" (1:4). Routines are the ordinary activities, roles, and relation-
ships of social life-what most of us spend most of our time doing.
Frameworks (or "structures," "contexts," or "formative contexts," see
1:3) are the underlying elements of society within which and by which we
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carry out and understand routines. "A formative context may consist in
imaginative assumptions about the possible and desirable forms of
human association as well as in institutional arrangements or noninstitu-
tionalized social practices" (1:89). Contexts shape and condition rou-
tines, as well as our persistent conflicts over the "mastery and use" of
society's resources (1:3). They are "[t]he imaginative scheme of models
of possible and desirable association" in a given society (2:271), and they
render communication possible by supplying "a subtext of shared as-
sumptions" (1:151). Formative contexts have two primary characteris-
tics. They change very slowly most of the time, and when they do
change significantly through some revolutionary upheaval, the result is a
change in "the form and outcome of conflicts" (1:152; cf 1:62). The
inertial weight of contexts and the impossibility of having none at all
easily delude people into regarding particular contexts as a given, a natu-
ral order of the universe. This "naturalistic premise" (1:23) is at the
heart of traditional social and political ideology and contemporary posi-
tivist social science. It is only partially and therefore unsuccessfully tran-
scended in modem radical political theories (1:25). It is also dead wrong.
There are no givens (other than the inescapability of having some con-
texts) and there is no natural order. To accord our particular contexts
naturalistic status is the primeval sin in Unger's universe. "When we
think and act in this way, we commit the sin the prophets called idolatry.
As a basis for self-understanding, it is worse than a sin. It is a mistake"
(1:18). We create contingent and intangible ideas of interest, identity,
and possibility (see, e.g., 1:84-87) in order to contain particular conflicts
and thereby stabilize a particular social order (1:151), and then we find
ourselves captives or even pious devotees of our own creations. One of
the central purposes of Politics is Unger's prophetic call to reject belief in
the false necessity of the frameworks in which we live.
Our intellectual and social worlds, then, are the products of our im-
agination, but they do not contain it. Indeed, no conceivable set of con-
texts-not even those Unger would have us create-can encompass the
power of human will and imagination: "the power of insight outreaches
all the statable contexts of thought" (1:20). All forms of traditional
thought and activity can be reimagined to be other than what they are
(1:32; 2:39). It is the primitive superstition of "structure fetishism" to
believe that our contexts "impose on our practical, passionate, and cogni-
tive relations a script we cannot easily rewrite" (1:201, emphasis added).
Politics presents a bold reworking of the Christian doctrine of crea-
tion. The God who created heaven and earth out of nothing by the Word
has been replaced by the humanity that creates its world by the force of
its individual and collective imagination. Just as the Christian God was
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under no external constraints other than those of logic, so Ungerian men
and women finally are limited only by the formal requirement that they
must have some contexts. What contexts they choose is essentially a
matter of their "insight and fecundity" (1:216). It is perhaps not entirely
insignificant that Unger likes to use the word "script" for the (false and
idolatrous) notion that there are contexts external to human imagining:
in the Ungerian universe we are free to rewrite whatever lines we seem to
have been given because we are the playwrights.
III. REDEMPTION: THE PRIMACY OF SELF-ASSERTION
Traditional Christianity teaches that human beings are created good
but that something is nevertheless wrong. The diagnosis of what is
wrong employs images and concepts such as those of the Fall and of sin.
The "cure" is the Christian doctrine of Redemption. 21 The men and wo-
men of Unger's universe live in a world that they have created, but they
too are strangely alienated. The very contexts that they create to enable
them to contain violence and make communication and community pos-
sible have become oppressive, confining, threatening. The contexts exer-
cise "a shaping, incantatory, even redemptive influence [LUnger clearly
means falsely redemptive; see the passage] upon the dark, labile force of
[human] emotions" (1:24).22 The works of our imaginations take on a
life of their own and offer a false security in return for our idolatrous
acceptance of their naturalness. Unger offers the doctrines of formative
context and false necessity as the diagnosis of our alienation.
Into this grim world, in which the very longings of our hearts are
limited and mocked (2:584), Unger sends the good news of a way to re-
21. On the Christian concepts of sin and the Fall, see Sponheim, Sin and Evil, in 1 CHRISTIAN
DOGMATIcS 359, 363-431 (C. Braaten & R. Jenson eds. 1984). In traditional Christianity, the state
of alienation and sin in which human beings find themselves cannot be overcome by human action,
but only through God's gift of the "freedom to accept [God's] own forgiving and redeeming self-
communication." K. RAHNER & H. VORGRIMLER, DICTIONARY Of THEOLOGY 433 (2d ed. 1981).
"The idea of self-redemption fails to do justice to the true nature and absolute depth of our need of
redemption (efforts towards emancipation and the realization of justice are necessary manifestations
of redemption, but are not its essence)." Id. For Unger, in contrast, we are the only and sufficient
agents of our liberation.
22. The context is Unger's discussion of the reasons why the "naturalistic premise," and the
given or "canonical" social orders that it underwrites, exercise so powerful a sway over human
thought and action despite the premise's falsity (1:24):
Finally, the canonical form of social life is natural because it is seen as connecting funda-
mental truth about society to equally basic truth about personality. The import of this
correspondence must be left deliberately loose: it bears different philosophical interpreta-
tions. All clear-cut versions of the naturalistic premise, however, attribute to the personal-
ity some proper order of emotions, or of virtues and vices. This order sustains, and is in
turn renewed by, the arrangements of the larger society. A person's repeated willingness to
meet the claims that the natural social order assigns to him exercises a shaping, incanta-
tory, even redemptive influence upon the dark, labile force of his emotions.
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demption. To be freed, he teaches, we need only assert our wills. Poli-
tics, to be sure, reads more like an academic exercise than a proselytizing
sermon, but to Unger this is an illusory distinction. The struggle for
redemption "may be pursued in imaginative work rather than out in the
open" (1:29). Politics, therefore, is a highly theoretical work ("un-
abashed theorizing" (2:8)) that is nonetheless directly redemptive in its
goals. "A fully developed social theory interprets our efforts at individ-
ual and collective self-assertion" (1:15) and precisely by doing so makes
redemptive, successful self-assertion possible.
Unger's account of the redemptive act of assertion is built, he insists,
on the elements of the older "radical commitment" to emancipation (see
1:1-17). That commitment had two clearly related aspects: "the subver-
sion of social division and hierarchy and the assertion of will over custom
and compulsion" (1:6). These aspects are, given Unger's understanding
of the imagined character of the world, opposite sides of the coin of "con-
scious mastery" (2:279) over all elements of our individual and corporate
lives. We are redeemed from captivity to the structures our imaginations
create when we assert intentional control over them (becoming "fully the
masters of our contexts" (2:99)). The progress of our emancipation can
be precisely measured by "our success at gaining mastery" (2:291).
Unger's faith in redemption through self-assertion directly informs
his political program. The goal of leftist politics, he claims, is the estab-
lishment of a "radical" or "empowered" democracy in which the tradi-
tional democratic themes of popular sovereignty and electoral
decisionmaking are carried out in a consistent and thoroughgoing man-
ner. The result will be a polity "that carries to [an] extreme the authority
of combinations of will over social arrangements" (2:213). Empowered
democracy, in short, is the collective form of the assertion of the unbri-
dled will.
We may live out redemptive self-assertion specifically through the
act of context-smashing, or, in another of Unger's peculiar phrases, "neg-
ative capability" (2:393).23 Because our capacities of will and imagina-
tion transcend any of the contexts that we create with them, we can
violate the limits we have set. We can destroy by the same means that we
use to create. In so doing we directly experience freedom: "We think
and act, at such moments, as if we were not ultimately limited by any-
thing" (1:18).
23. The expression itself is sometimes used by literary critics, but with a different meaning. See,
e.g., E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION ix (1967) (A "compelling writer reminds us that
wisdom lies in 'negative capability'-the capacity to be 'in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without
any irritable reaching after fact and reason.' ").
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Described at its most general, context-smashing sounds like an im-
possibly heroic venture. Fortunately, Unger tells us, it actually builds on
something going on all the time in society. Social order is actually con-
stituted in part by ongoing minor conflicts over power. These conflicts
are usually understood to be taking place within existing frameworks and
thereby to be reaffirming them. But such "context-preserving" conflicts
can escalate. The development of negative capability entails diminishing
the distance between such clashes and "context-transforming conflict"
that shatters, rather than preserves, the structures (1:7-8). Individuals
who recognize "the primacy of transforming denial" (1:30), i.e., the self-
assertive refusal to accept the limits of our contexts, can shatter the es-
tablished order of our confining communities (1:59). In doing so, they
realize their own emancipation and further the cause of general freedom.
In fact, Unger argues, our quest for fulfillment proceeds mainly through
acts of context-smashing. "Our practical, theoretical, and spiritual pro-
gress is largely the record of these repeated limit breakings" (1:18).
Unger appropriately personalizes the redemptive activity of self-as-
sertion in his notion of the "transformative vocation." The idea is that,
as Unger's modernist account of personality reveals,24 the only means of
defining a free self as against formative contexts is to live a life character-
ized by transgression of the limits. "To be fully a person.., you must
engage in a struggle against the defects or the limits of existing society or
available knowledge" (1:29). The transformative vocation is to treat even
the most mundane "routine dealings" of life as "possible objects of a
transformative will and imagination" (3:11). For Unger, a redeemed life
is one that faces and exults in our "ineradicable homelessness in the
world" 25 by continually destroying all our imaginative attempts to build
a home here.
In many respects, the heart of Unger's thought lies in this, in the
vision of a free-because-transforming mode of life. Indeed, Unger explic-
itly suggests that Politics can be read "as an attempt to carry to the hilt
the view of society and personality within which the idea of the trans-
formative vocation makes sense" (1:35). Emancipation is self-assertion,
and self-assertion is the exercise of our capacity to destroy and rebuild
our self-created contexts (2:393). Unger acknowledges the existence of a
transcendent quality (1:23, referring to our "strange freedom from any
given finite structure") to transformative life, but unlike traditional
Christians he ascribes it to the individual's prior "residual sense" of her-
self or himself as the willful, imaginative center of a personal universe
24. See R. UNGER, supra note 2.
25. Id. at 24.
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(2:320; see also 1:33). The traditional account of redemption as the free
gift of the divine Other has been turned upside down into a summons to
assert the sovereignty of the self.
IV. CHURCH: THE COMMUNITY OF CONFLICT
Unger identifies the chief obstacle to self-assertion as the constraints
imposed by formative contexts. Although, as discussed above, the exist-
ence of some contexts is necessary or at least unavoidable, whatever con-
texts in fact arise follow a predictable course by which they stifle the very
creativity and willfulness that brought them into being. Formative con-
texts are generated out of conflict over the basic terms of human society.
At some point in every such conflict throughout history, the longing for
security has become greater than the desire for change or victory. "De-
feated or exhausted, people stop fighting" (1:151). The terms of the ensu-
ing social truce reflect the particular contours of the conflict rather than
any foreordained pattern: "The stabilization of a social world requires
the spiritualization of violence" (2:398). Nevertheless, these terms grad-
ually assume an appearance of inevitability that enables them to stabilize
the social world; they become formative contexts. Contexts differ within
and across societies in the extent to which they are "entrenched" or im-
pervious to challenge and question. The more entrenched a set of con-
texts becomes, the more rigid and hierarchical the society, and the more
difficult redemptive self-assertion becomes (1:154). The most basic social
task for Unger, therefore, is to find a collective way to break the pattern
by which contexts become a deadening "frozen politics" of "conflicts in-
terrupted or contained" (1:145).
The answer is "disentrenchment," the process of rendering social
structures ever more questionable in all their aspects (1:154-56). Histori-
cally this has occurred only in moments of great social crisis that are in
the end so exhausting that they lead to a new cycle of hardening social
relationships. Disentrenchment must be decoupled from this patternby
becoming a feature of even the most basic assumptions shared during
"civic peace" (2:279). The extraordinary must become the common-
place: "a style of factional rivalry [as opposed to civil war] that regularly
questions the practical and imaginative foundations to the established so-
cial order" (2:465).
The communal form of Unger's gospel is the formation of a commu-
nity of conflict, a society in which social cohesion is supplied by the very
conflict that historic social patterns have attempted to contain or elimi-
nate. All relationships, institutions, and beliefs must have an "indefinite
susceptibility to penetration and revision" (3:12). Everything must be up
for grabs; the only agenda must be that there is no set agenda; the social
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structure must be an anti-structure, designed to undermine itself continu-
ally. The historic pattern by which formative contexts give increasing
definition to human nature and to social relationships must be inverted
so that even in the most ordinary activities people win recognize "the
indefinition of self and society" (2:398). Unger's "ideal" is "a society
broken open to everyone's will" (2:404).
As Unger intends, the community he describes is one oriented to-
ward self-assertion. It is also-or, rather, therefore-the setting of con-
tinual conflict. Unger fully recognizes this fact, and indeed regards it as
one of the most important and attractive aspects of his social program.
Self-assertive freedom in any group larger than one leads directly to-
indeed, is constituted by-"contests of force and imagination" (3:20).
Like war (see 3:113), conflict is unavoidable; "[tihere must be a victory
and a defeat" (2:254). Rather than attempting to deny or escape this
reality, Unger's social theory extols it as the product of freedom in ac-
tion. Unger ridicules as "an inveterate goody-goody" the would-be radi-
cal who does not grasp "the controversial and conflictual character of
social life" (2:418). He is equally harsh in his rejection of attempts to
imagine communities constituted by peace or reconciliation. Such ideas,
he says, rest on a mistaken belief in the possibility of genuinely "shared
values or conflict-free harmony" (1:44; cf 1:70 on the essentially fictive
nature of all shared "interests"). The social vision that results is "[a]n
impoverished and unbelievable idea of community" (2:560).
The state is of crucial importance in Unger's account of an emanci-
pated society. It will be neither transcended in the Kingdom nor dis-
carded after the arrival of the classless society, but will become even
more crucial to social life.26 Only "central state authority, that great and
perilous lever of transformation" (2:432), is powerful enough to counter-
act and break up the tendency of formative contexts to become en-
trenched, and it must be continuously available for that purpose. One of
the most innovative of Unger's specific political proposals, the idea of
"destabilization rights," is an attempt to envision a legal system in which
anyone can invoke state power to challenge any element of social, eco-
nomic, or political life in the interest of preventing entrenchment (2:530-
35).27 The state is the crucial collective aspect of redemption because
only it can provide "the occasions and the means to challenge and revise
every aspect of the basic institutional structure of society" (2:449). Just
as the individual is most centrally characterized by her capacity for the
26. Unger strongly dislikes most liberal political devices designed to restrain the state's jurisdic-
tion or power. But see 2:524-30 (Unger's argument for "immunity rights" that would protect physi-
cal safety, liberty, and a minimum level of welfare entitlements from interference).
27. See also R. UNGER, supra note 6, at 52-56.
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transformative vocation (see 1:29), so the very "statishness" of the state
lies in its "capacity for transformative action" (3:80-81, :85).
Unger's message of redemption shares with traditional Christianity
the belief that the locus of salvation is in community.28 However, Un-
ger's community, his "church," is a curious photographic negative of the
Christian vision of the Church as a community of reconciliation and
peace. The outward and institutionalized form of Unger's community is
a state armed with the power to intervene in (almost) all aspects of
human life. Its authority is coercive, and oriented toward exacerbating
rather than reconciling conflict. Its central and characterizing activity is
the tearing down of existing relationships, not their loving reconstitution.
V. SALVATION: THE EMANCIPATION OF EXPERIENCE
What then is Unger's ultimate vision, the salvation to which he
would lead people? Politics is a long and complicated work, and a great
deal of it is concerned with quite detailed discussions of particular socio-
economic and political issues ranging from Unger's notion of a "rotating
capital fund" intended to decentralize and democratize the economy
(2:491-502) to the organizational prerequisites for military victory
(3:153-206). But throughout all the detail, I believe, Unger is remarkably
consistent in his portrayal of the redeemed life of freedom. Unger sees
salvation as the emancipation of humans from anything and everything
that limits their capacity for experience and for the exercise of imagina-
tion and will. 29
Unger expresses this goal in a number of ways. At the beginning of
Politics, Unger describes the work's purpose as the total development of
"the liberal and leftist aim of cleansing from our forms of practical col-
laboration or passionate attachment the taint of dependence and domina-
tion" (1:1). Salvation as freedom from dependence and domination is a
pervasive theme in Politics. At one point Unger refers to "the dangers of
dependence and depersonalization" (1:155). Indeed, dependence, domi-
nation, and depersonalization are almost synonymous for Unger. If self-
assertion is the redemptive mode of establishing one's personhood, de-
pendence on another amounts to domination by her. Dependence is de-
personalization. (Unger's rejection of dependence extends to ideas that
28. On the centrality of community to Christian thought and action, see S. HAUERWAS, A
COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER (1981).
29. Traditional Christianity understands salvation as the accomplishment of God's purposes in
creating humanity, including "the fulfillment of what is natural" in human existence, "the reestab-
lishment or restoration of community, and especially of loving community out of estrangement,
separation, and conflict," and "the centering of life around the divine center." L. GILKEY, supra
note 12, at 227.
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human behavior should be constrained by external roles or narratives
(1:26-30), since all such ideas "belittle and enslave" the individual (2:231-
32).)
Unger notes that it is when we break the "practical, theoretical[, or]
spiritual" limits to our world that we experience freedom as he under-
stands it-thought and action then proceed "as if we were not ultimately
limited by anything" (1:18). In Unger's brave new world, the experience
of limitlessness will be extended to "our ordinary social experience"
(2:449). Political and social ideas are subject to "the test of personal
experience" (2:431) for their capacity to further the goal of placing "the
fewest possible constraints upon experimentation" (2:514). Collaborative
and relational activities must subserve the development of our "individ-
ual life projects" (2:291). In the Ungerian social world, we will be free to
"take our cues from wherever we like" in working out our unique self-
identities (2:232). The "ideal effect" of Unger's program on human per-
sonality will be "the enlargement of the imagination" and "the accentua-
tion of desire"-all desire (2:579-80). "This goal holds for desire in
general, whatever its specific aim or relative weight" (2:579).
Does Unger really believe in this refurbished version of earlier vi-
sions of humanity as the Promethean ego, experiencing all and being
touched by nothing and no one? I suggest that he does. At one point
Unger candidly remarks that the results of his goal of empowering people
to expand their experiences would "differ less than might appear" from
the aimless hedonism of "the educated middle classes of the rich North
Atlantic countries" (2:544). Even more chillingly, in an earlier draft of
Politics, Unger explicitly stated that his goal was to impart to all of social
life "what the Marquis de Sade recommended for sex: the strenuous en-
largement of enacted possibility."'30 Unger has toned down the rhetoric
of that particular passage in the published version, but the message re-
mains the same. Ungerian salvation is the realized possibility of explor-
ing all conceivable experience, heedless of any limits and in the service of
individual greatness (2:579, 584).
What sort of people would-or could-live in the world of Unger-
ian emancipation? Unger rejects the notion that they would possess
some intrinsically healthy range of emotions or a character formed by the
exercise of particular virtues: there is no "proper order of emotions, or of
virtues and vices" (1:24). Nor would emancipation restore humanity to
some sort of pre-enslavement purity: when innocence rather than imagi-
nation and capacity is made someone's goal, achievement of that goal
"corrupts" her (2:115). Unger recognizes that only a Nietzchean Over-
30. Ball, The City of Unger, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 625, 655 n.159 (1987).
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man could relish living in his community of conflict. "People who can
readily put on their agenda the foundations of the world they inhabit
must be haughty, high-spirited, and even reckless. They must be secure
in an inviolable independence" (2:134). When such persons appear in
history (such as Napoleon; see 2:581-85) or literature (such as Bazarov in
Turgenev's Fathers and Sons 31), they either fascinate or repulse more or-
dinary folk; they always seem different or strange to the rest of us. Just
so: human freedom according to Unger is a "strange freedom" (1:23)
and its achievement by the "ordinary person" would make her "more
like the poet, whose visionary heightening of expressed emotion may bor-
der on unintelligibility and aphasia" (2:566).
It is only by ruthlessly smashing our stabilizing and confining con-
texts that we can find "happiness and ennoblement" (2:304) and satisfy
our "hidden and insulted longing for greatness" (2:584). Unger responds
explicitly to the anticipated charge that this vision is "almost empty" of
substantive content in that it "do[es] not tell us what" the particular
forms of our individual and collective greatness will be (2:580). He re-
jects the charge on two grounds. First, his social theory yields a concrete
institutional program, and second, it is not possible even in theory to
develop a "canonical list" of desirable outcomes (2:580). It is intrinsic to
Ungerian freedom that the results of its exercise will be strange and sur-
prising. (The themes of strangeness and surprise are pervasive in Politics.
See, e.g., 1:5, 1:34, 1:127, 1:146, 2:110, 2:213, 2:218.) More fundamental
yet is the fact that for Unger, redemptive self-assertion is master, not
servant, of the goals it selects: "means create their own ends" (3:13).
For the emancipated person, the clear distinction that the rest of us see
between a "social order cleansed of force and fraud" and one dominated
by "treachery and violence" fades from view (1:45). For her, the choice
is not between good and evil, but between choice itself and enslavement.
Unger's vision of salvation is, from a traditional Christian perspec-
tive, a nightmare. His social goal is to create a world without commu-
nity or tradition, to write an anti-narrative in which all we share is
struggle and mutual surprise. In the New Testament we are told that
faith, hope, and love will abide; in the Ungerian world, these, like all
other virtues, dispositions, and beliefs, must be sacrificed so that "fuller
forms of self-assertion and attachment" can emerge (see the entire, ex-
traordinary passage, 2:575).
31. In an unpublished paper I have explored Turgenev's portrayal in Fathers and Sons of how
an "emancipated" personality would appear. See J. Powell, Images of the Nihilist in Turgenev's
Fathers and Sons (Jan. 15, 1988) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file in offices of Duke Law
Journal).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay began with the interpretive decision to approach Politics
from a position shaped by Unger's explicit and implicit theological
claims. Such an interpretive stance, I have suggested, takes Unger's gen-
uine roots in the Christian theological tradition seriously. The value of
this approach, at least in part, has been to highlight the remarkable par-
allels and enormous dissimilarities between Unger's thought and tradi-
tional Christianity. Politics presents an account of creation (through
human imagination), redemption (through self-assertion), church (the
"community" of conflict), and salvation (the limitless expansion of the
range of experience). The attractiveness of his detailed political program
ought to be evaluated in the context of this vision. The program, after
all, is a serious attempt to outline the means for transforming our social
world of false necessity into Unger's emancipated universe of "haughty,
high-spirited, and even reckless" individualists (2:134). The program's
success would create a world in which even our profoundest accomplish-
ments in personal relationships and social justice would be subject to rad-
ical overthrow and rejection-Unger cannot and does not limit the scope
of negative capability to the destruction of morally objectionable ele-
ments in our contexts. All of our contexts-our beliefs, practices, insti-
tutions, and relationships-can and in the end must be sacrificed on the
altar of empowerment (see 2:575). Those for whom this vision is not
morally attractive ought to hesitate to accept a program intended to im-
plement it.
Professor Unger's fundamental vision resembles that of the nine-
teenth and twentieth century "modernists" whom he admires (1:222-
23).32 But Politics has parallels in a much earlier period. Unger's radical
gospel of emancipation looks very much like a brilliant repristination of
that ancient Christian heresy,33 gnosticism.3 4 Near the beginning of Poli-
tics, Unger refers to what he calls "one of the oldest and most puzzling
themes of our civilization: the idea that man is the infinite caught within
the finite" (1:17). Many of the ancient gnostics saw human beings-at
least those with "pneumatic" (spiritual) natures-as alien visitors from a
32. See also R. UNGER, supra note 2, at 7-39 (discussing in detail the modernist thesis about
contexts).
33. My comparison of Unger's vision to an ancient heresy is deliberate. Theologically, a heresy
is a grave error of thought and commitment made by someone within the theological community:
"The heretic takes a truth out of the organic whole which is the faith and ... misunderstands it," K.
RAHNER & H. VORGRIMLER, supra note 21, at 206.
34. Ancient gnosticism was a theological movement or collection of movements that stressed
the power of individuals-or at least of the spiritual elite-to free themselves from alienction by
acquiring knowledge (in Greek, gnosis) of their true identity. See J. KELLY, EARLY CHRIsTIAN
DOCTRINES 22-28 (rev. ed. 1978).
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heavenly realm, trapped by matter and ignorance in a world to which
they were by nature superior. Redemption was available through the
attainment and exercise of the true gnosis (knowledge) about the pneu-
matics' origins and predicament. The gnostic's vocation thus was not to
contribute to the building up of a community of reconciled sinners con-
stituted by a particular history, but to free herself from all earthly limits.
Unger's new gnosticism revives this ancient myth, and reproduces many
of the conceptual and ethical problems that contributed to mainstream
Christianity's rejection of gnosticism: its excessive optimism in the
power of the mind, its disdain for the particularized and material embod-
iment of human existence, its ethical elitism. His gospel is that "the gates
of universal spiritual seduction" (1:57) are open, and that passing
through them we can achieve mastery and experience freedom "from any
given finite structure" (1:23). We are capable of infinity, Unger
promises, if only we dare to reach out and mold our own destinies. Thus
spake the serpent to Eve.
